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9	LINITED STATES DISTRICT COLUDT
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
13	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) No.: CR 05-0672 MHP
14	Plaintiff,) ORDER OF DETENTION
15	v.) PENDING TRIAL
16	DAVID HENDERSON,
17	Defendant.)
18	This matter came before the Court on November 22, 29, and 30, 2005 for detention
19	hearings. Defendant David Henderson was present and represented by Chief Assistant Federal
20	Public Defender Geoffrey Hanson. Assistant United States Attorney Robert David Rees
21	appeared for the United States of America.
22	Pretrial Services submitted a report to the Court and the parties that recommended
23	detention, and a representative of Pretrial Services was present at the hearings. The government
24	requested detention, and Defendant opposed. Proffers, exhibits, and arguments affecting
25	detention were submitted by the parties at the hearings.
26	Upon consideration of the facts, exhibits, proffers, and arguments presented, the Court
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finds by a preponderance of the evidence that although there are conditions under which release could reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant upon release, those conditions (*i.e.*, a viable surety) have not been met here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant must be detained pending trial in this matter, unless and until those conditions can be satisfied.

The present order supplements the Court's findings at the detention hearing and serves as a written findings of fact and statement of reasons as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1).

At the outset, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that he has a Sixth Amendment right under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) to call and cross-examine prosecution witnesses in a detention hearing and that the government cannot proceed by proffer. No court has held a detention hearing is a "criminal prosecution" to which the Sixth Amendment applies. Cf. U.S. v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (Sixth Amendment does not apply to revocation hearing on supervised release), U.S. v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1986) (defendant has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses not called to testify in detention hearing). See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (emphasizing regulatory aspect of pre-trial detention). On the other hand, due process does apply. Under some circumstances (e.g. where the government's argument for detention is based on evidence of questionable reliability and there is not good reason not to present the witness for examination) a defendant may be entitled to cross-examine adverse witness(es) as a matter of due process. See U.S. v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999); Winsor, 785 F.2d at 757 (implying that if there is a proper proffer, defendant may have right to cross-examine investigator and police officers). However, because the Court relies herein on relatively undisputed evidence about the alleged offense, Defendant's circumstances and criminal history, it concludes cross-examination would have little utility here and is not mandated by due process.

The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50, sets forth four factors which the Court must consider in determining whether pretrial detention is warranted. These factors are:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged ($\S 3142(g)(1)$);

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- (2) the weight of the evidence against the person ($\S 3142(g)(2)$);
- (3) the history and characteristics of the person including, among other considerations, character, employment, family, and past conduct and criminal history (§ 3142(g)(3)); and
- (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release ($\S 3142(g)(4)$).

With regard to the first factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, Defendant is accused of unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Court takes notice of the transcript of a preliminary hearing in San Mateo County which outlines the underlying facts of the present charge. According to the transcript, Defendant David Henderson was arrested at the scene of a break-in at a gun store on June 10, 2005. A car registered to Defendant had been driven through the front windows and wall of the store, and two 12-gauge shotguns had been loaded inside the store. Police also found evidence indicating that several shotgun rounds were discharged in the store. Upon his arrest, Defendant tested positive for cocaine. While Defendant would prefer a more extensive cross-examination of the officers on the scene, these facts do not appear to be seriously in dispute.

The second factor, the weight of the evidence, is considered the least important of the factors. The Bail Reform Act neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination of guilt. *United States v. Gebro*, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the weight of the evidence, which is entitled to some consideration, appears strong. It appears undisputed that Defendant crashed his car into the gun store, exercised dominion and control over at least one firearm and caused it to fire more than once.

The Court further finds that the third factor, the history and characteristics of the defendant, militate against the defendant and in favor of detention. The Pretrial Services Report confirms the defendant has an extensive criminal history. Defendant has suffered numerous convictions, including three separate felonies and five misdemeanors. A number of these

convictions occurred while Defendant was on probation for a prior offense, and indicate a failure to adhere to court orders and rules.

Defendant's criminal history and the Pretrial Services Report also reveals that seven bench warrants have been issued against Defendant. To be sure, Defendant has raised substantial questions about whether some of those warrants were for reasons other than failures to appear or were mitigated, but in at least one instance, the failure to appear resulted in revocation of bail.

Defendant's record indicates that he is not generally amenable to supervision. Defendant has violated his probation several times, and his background does not indicate the kind of reliability that would reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance, at least under the conditions of state court supervision to which he has been subjected.

As to his ties to the community, Defendant has provided no available individual to act as a bond surety or custodian. No one has appeared in court, provided a letter of support, or made themselves available for pre-trial interview.

With respect to the fourth factor, the nature and seriousness of the danger to the community, the Court does not believe that the government has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant poses any such danger that cannot be met by a combination of conditions.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court notes that most of the prior offenses are related to drugs or property crimes (*e.g.* burglary, hit and run) and that despite prior probation violations, he did successfully complete diversion in 2004. Accordingly, despite prior transgressions of court supervision and bench warrants, the Court is prepared to accept Defendant's proffered condition of release to a half-way house, if he can demonstrate some degree of community support. However, as noted above, he has not been able to garner any person willing to step forward and vouch for him, even though he has relatives in the local area and has lived and worked here for years. It appears, therefore, he has no real ties to this

community and no support. If he can produce someone who will vouch for him, the Court will release him to a half-way house.

Accordingly, based on all of the evidence above, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that no presently available condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant as required. The Court is open to reconsideration as stated herein.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), IT IS ORDERED THAT:

- (1) the Defendant be, and hereby is, committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal;
- (2) the Defendant be afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with his counsel; and
- (3) on order of a court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the government, the person in charge of the corrections facility in which the Defendant is confined shall deliver the defendant to an authorized Deputy United States Marshal for the purpose of any appearance in connection with a court proceeding.

Dated: December 9, 2005

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ARD M. CHEN United States Magistrate Judge

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